Developmental changes in young children's willingness to copy the antisocial actions of ingroup members in a minimal group context by Wilks, Matti et al.
 1	  
 2	  
 3	  
BRIEF REPORT 4	  
Developmental Changes in Young Children’s Willingness to Copy the 5	  
Antisocial Actions of Ingroup Members in a Minimal Group Context 6	  
Matti Wilks 7	  
University of Queensland 8	  
James Kirby 9	  
University of Queensland and Stanford University 10	  
Mark Nielsen 11	  
University of Queensland and University of Johannesburg 12	  
 13	  
 14	  
 15	  
 16	  
 17	  
 18	  
 19	  
 20	  
 21	  
 22	  
 23	  
 24	  
Abstract  25	  
Children hold strong in-group biases from a young age, liking in-group over out-group members and 26	  
preferring them as social learning models. Simultaneously, children are also highly prosocial – both in 27	  
their own helping behaviors and their avoidance of those who behave antisocially. This study explores 28	  
how children of two age groups (4-5 and 7-8 years) react when these biases conflict; that is, when 29	  
children’s in-group behaves antisocially. Children were assigned to a group and given a pre-measure 30	  
of liking to assess in-group bias. They were then shown videos of the in-group behaving antisocially 31	  
and the out-group behaving prosocially (or neutral controls). Children were then given the opportunity 32	  
to choose which group to imitate and if they wanted to change groups, and again given a measure of 33	  
liking. Results revealed that older children were highly sensitive to pro and antisocial behavior; when 34	  
their in-group was antisocial they were less likely to imitate them, reported liking them less and were 35	  
more likely to want to change groups. In contrast, younger children imitated the in-group and reported 36	  
liking them more regardless of their behavior and actually reported wanting to change groups less 37	  
when their group was antisocial. This demonstrates a clear developmental jump between younger and 38	  
older children in their capacity to weigh multiple strands of information when making decisions, and 39	  
in particular highlights the emergence of strong prosocial concern that persists over a drive to affiliate 40	  
with an in-group.  41	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In order to become active and valued members of their in-group, children must learn 48	  
appropriate norms of behavior and the culturally specific ways of using and interacting with the 49	  
multifarious objects and artefacts that surround them. While there are many avenues of learning 50	  
available to them, one of the most effective and powerful is imitation; reproducing the means, goals or 51	  
intentions, and outcomes of another’s actions (Want & Harris, 2002). There is now a vast, yet ever 52	  
growing, corpus of literature documenting children’s pervasive imitative proclivities, literature that 53	  
underpins claims we have a unique inclination for precise copying of others which set us on a gene-54	  
culture co-evolutionary path distinct from all other species (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Henrich & 55	  
McElreath, 2003; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). But what happens 56	  
when those who children learn from act in ways that violate acceptable standards, that is, behave in an 57	  
antisocial way? The aim of the current research was to answer this question.  58	  
From early infancy humans acquire the skills needed to use novel objects by watching and 59	  
copying what others do with them (Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Meltzoff, 1988). By two years of 60	  
age children show a proclivity to copy others so inclusively that they will incorporate visibly, causally 61	  
irrelevant actions (e.g. Kenward, 2012; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & 62	  
Horner, 2007; Nielsen, 2006). Critically, this proclivity for high fidelity copying is not a derivative of 63	  
children blindly replicating everything shown to them but is rather part of a process in which 64	  
decisions are made based on a range of different dimensions regarding what to copy, who to copy and 65	  
when to copy  (Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013). Children’s proclivity for imitation becomes increasingly 66	  
socially motivated from the pre-school years (Over & Carpenter, 2013), and they will prefer models 67	  
who are culturally typical as demonstrated by physical cues or support from other established in-68	  
group members (Harris & Corriveau, 2011). Children prefer to imitate in-group over out-group 69	  
members (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013; Howard, Henderson, Carrazza, & 70	  
Woodward, 2015, but see Gruber, Deschenaux, Frick, & Clément, 2017) and will even actively 71	  
contrast their behavior to that of out-groups (Oostenbroek & Over, 2015).  72	  
 Children’s social motivations to imitate are not, however, all-encompassing. For example, 73	  
children will prioritize copying successful out-group individuals over unsuccessful in-group members 74	  
(Wilks, Collier-­‐Baker, & Nielsen, 2015). This is contextualised, though, by functional failure by the 75	  
in-group and absence of social pressure to conform. Indeed, there is a complex interplay between 76	  
evaluating others’ pro/antisocial behavior and inherent in-group biases (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; 77	  
Hetherington, Hendrickson, & Koenig, 2014; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 2016). Of relevance 78	  
to the current study, children’s imitative responses are diminished when the consequent actions cause 79	  
destruction of another’s property (Keupp, Bancken, Schillmöller, Rakoczy, & Behne, 2016), though 80	  
notably, this study did not manipulate in-group affiliation. Hetherington, Hendrickson, and Koenig 81	  
(2014) found that immoral in-group behavior reduced children’s in-group liking (but see Schug, 82	  
Shusterman, Barth, & Patalano, 2013), but that desire to learn from the in-group persisted even when 83	  
the in-group behaved immorally. This study did not test for imitation. What remains unknown is the 84	  
extent of children’s willingness to imitate the antisocial behavior of their in-group.  85	  
In the main experimental manipulation of the current study we presented children with videos 86	  
in which in-group members, manipulated via a minimal group paradigm, engaged in antisocial 87	  
behavior and out-group members performed contrasting prosocial actions. We measured children’s 88	  
willingness to imitate the actions demonstrated to them, as well as their general social perceptions of 89	  
each group. This allowed us to explore the interplay between two competing, and pervasive, social 90	  
preferences: in-group bias (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Sherif, 1961) and prosocial concern 91	  
(Hamlin, Karen, Paul, & Neha, 2011; McAuliffe, Blake, & Warneken, 2017; Warneken, 2016). 92	  
Previous research has shown that children are less likely to imitate actions that cause damage to others 93	  
(Keupp et al., 2016) and report liking antisocial in-group members less (Hetherington et al., 2014). In 94	  
following, we predicted that children who saw their in-group behaving antisocially would be less 95	  
willing to imitate them, would report liking them less, and would have a stronger desire to swap into 96	  
an alternative group compared to when the videos were stripped of moral detail. Moreover, to trace 97	  
possible developmental trajectories, we included children aged 4-5 and 7-8 years. These ages were 98	  
chosen as past research has documented developmental changes in children’s tendency to consider 99	  
others when making socio-moral judgments (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Elenbaas, Rizzo, Cooley, & 100	  
Killen, 2016; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011), greater adherence to 101	  
prosocial norms (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013), and greater willingness to incur personal cost to 102	  
rectify prosocial violations (McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011). 103	  
Moreover, recent research suggests that, as children age, they have greater capacity to consider both 104	  
group biases and prosocial concern when making judgments about the intersection of the two (see 105	  
Rutland & Killen, 2015, 2017). In line with this we predicted that, when exposed to antisocial in-106	  
group members, older, but not younger, children would be less likely to imitate their in-group and 107	  
would show a greater reduction in in-group liking and a higher desire to change groups, compared to 108	  
when the in-group behaved neutrally.   109	  
Method  110	  
Participants 111	  
This project ‘The sociocultural factors that contribute to moral development’ was given 112	  
approval by the School of Psychology Ethics Review Committee within the University of [blinded], 113	  
approval number 15-PSYCH-PHD-52-JH. A total of 164 children agreed to participate. Of these 63% 114	  
were Caucasian; 6% Southeast Asian; 1% Northeast Asian; 2% mixed race; and 28% chose not to 115	  
report ethnicity. Of those who reported being mixed race 1% were Southeast Asian and People of the 116	  
Americas; 1% Northwest Asian and People of the Americas, and 1% North African and Middle 117	  
Eastern. Nineteen children did not participate due to logistical demands (changing their mind, upset 118	  
sibling, rushed parent). Ultimately, a total of 145 children participated in the experiment. Thirty-one 119	  
were excluded after testing (13 for failing manipulation checks, 10 for being outside of the focus age 120	  
range, 5 due to experimenter error, and 3 due to shyness), leaving a final sample of 114 children. 121	  
Children were divided into two age groups: older (M = 94.78 months, SD = 7.54, range = 72-108) and 122	  
younger (M = 63.14, SD = 6.25, range = 48-72) (Sex, age and condition breakdown are provided 123	  
Table 1). Primary data collection occurred at a science museum (140 children), with some occurring 124	  
in dedicated testing labs at a large university (5 children).  All children were randomly assigned to an 125	  
experimental or control condition.  126	  
 127	  
Younger (4-5 years)                     Sex 
Condition Male Female  
Control 12 12 
Experimental  12 11 
Older (7-8 years)                       Sex 
Condition Male Female  
Control 15 16 
Experimental  13 19 
Table 1. Frequency and breakdown of final sample sex and age by condition.  128	  
Procedure 129	  
Children were first allocated to a green or grey group using a minimal group paradigm. 130	  
Children were asked to remove a coloured token from a drawstring bag, and were told that whichever 131	  
colour they picked would be their group for the game today. This process appeared random to the 132	  
child, but in reality there was only one colour option in the bag, with the colour and condition 133	  
assignment predetermined by a computerized randomizer. After being assigned to the group, the 134	  
experimenter provided a short description of each, adapted from previous research (Oostenbroek & 135	  
Over, 2015): “You’re in the green group because you picked the green coin, but there is also a grey 136	  
group. The green group and the grey group are on different teams. In every competition the green 137	  
group wants to beat the grey group and the grey group wants to beat the green group. The green 138	  
group works together as a team to beat the grey group and the grey group works together as a team 139	  
to beat the green group”. Children were then narratively checked for comprehension. If children were 140	  
unable to identify their group, the information was re-presented. No child took more than two 141	  
attempts to correctly identify their group.  142	  
Following group allocation, children were asked to answer how much they liked the in-group 143	  
and the out-group. The experimenter stated “Can you show me how much you like the green/grey 144	  
group?” This question was presented on a child-friendly 1-5 Likert type scale with happy to sad faces 145	  
(Figure 1). Scale comprehension was checked narratively for this question, and all other questions, 146	  
and the scale was re-presented if necessary. Again, no child took more than two attempts to 147	  
comprehend any scale throughout the experiment.  148	  
 149	  
Figure 1. Likert type scale employed in experiment.  150	  
Once allocated, children were shown a pair of videos of the in-group and out-group 151	  
performing pro/antisocial tasks (or a neutral control). Children were then given the opportunity to 152	  
imitate the task they had witnessed. After children’s first imitation trial, this process was repeated for 153	  
a second, different, task. As such, each child saw four videos – two pairings of an in-group and out-154	  
group performing a task. Video presentation order was randomized via the video presentation 155	  
software, both between groups and across tasks. The prosocial and antisocial nature varied based on 156	  
condition: in the experimental condition the in-group performed an antisocial task and the out-group 157	  
performed a prosocial task. This was compared to a control condition in which both groups tasks that 158	  
were physically equivalent but were void of moral layering – that, is they were morally neutral (Table 159	  
2 for brief description, Appendix A for full description). After viewing the videos, children were 160	  
narratively checked for comprehension, gauging their understanding of both the tasks and the 161	  
motivation behind the actions. If children did not understand the videos, they were replayed. If 162	  
children were still unable to understand after a second viewing, their data were excluded (a total of 15 163	  
children with data retained required a second viewing of the videos throughout the entire experiment, 164	  
and their responses did not differ on any of the outcome measures). After comprehension checks, the 165	  
apparatus from the videos were placed in front of the child and they were given the opportunity to 166	  
perform the previously demonstrated tasks. The experimenter stated “Look these are the things from 167	  
the video. Now you get to have a turn with them. Can you show me what you want to do?” If children 168	  
queried what to do the experimenter simply said “You can do anything you want, it’s up to you”. Each 169	  
trial was considered complete once the child had finished interacting with the apparatus, had explicitly 170	  
stated that they were finished, or once 60 seconds had elapsed.  171	  
 Control (neutral)  Experimental (pro/antisocial) 
Sticker Task  The agent finds stickers that belong 
to no one and places stickers in a 
clear box (prosocial equivalent) or 
an opaque box (antisocial 
equivalent).  
The agent finds stickers that belong to 
Sam and places them in a clear box “so 
Sam can find them later” (prosocial) or 
an opaque box “so Sam can’t find them 
later (antisocial)”.  
Paper Task  The agent needs to fill up a box 
with paper. They find two pieces of 
paper that belong to no one and 
either choose to tear up a piece of 
plain paper (prosocial equivalent) 
or a piece of patterned paper 
(antisocial equivalent).  
The agent needs to fill up a box with 
paper. They find two pieces of paper – a 
plain one that belongs to no one and a 
patterned one that belongs to Alex. 
They either choose to tear up a piece of 
plain paper (prosocial equivalent) or a 
piece of patterned paper (antisocial 
equivalent). 
Table 2. Brief description of control vs. experimental conditions for each demonstrated scenario.  172	  
Children subsequently undertook the same process for the second set of task videos. Once 173	  
children had completed imitation for the second task, they were again presented with the in-group and 174	  
out-group liking ratings. Children were asked if they wanted to change groups (yes/no). Finally, 175	  
children were thanked for their participation, offered a reward (wrist band) and both guardians and 176	  
children were debriefed.  177	  
Stimuli  178	  
The actors in the stimuli videos were four females of Caucasian descent, aged between 20 and 179	  
25 years. The stimuli comprised eight videos – four for the experimental and four for the control 180	  
condition, with each child viewing four videos during the experiment (two per task). For the 181	  
experimental condition the tasks were prosocial and antisocial, while in the control condition the tasks 182	  
were matched but without a pro/antisocial element. The ‘paper’ task involved the actor needing to fill 183	  
a jar with paper, and was required to choose a piece of paper to do so. The prosocial version involved 184	  
tearing up paper that did not belong to anyone (thereby avoiding tearing up paper that belonged to 185	  
someone else), while the antisocial task actively involved tearing up paper that did belong to 186	  
someone. The ‘sticker’ task involved an agent finding stickers that belonged to someone else. In the 187	  
prosocial version the stickers were placed where the owner could find them. In contrast, the antisocial 188	  
version involved the stickers being hidden from the owner. The neutral control condition for both 189	  
tasks involved removing the ownership from each scenario i.e. neither the pieces of paper nor the 190	  
stickers were identified as belonging to anyone. This allowed us to match the actions identically, 191	  
while only varying the motivation behind the actions (see Appendix A for full details).  192	  
Coding 193	  
Children’s imitative responses were coded dichotomously (1 = imitated in-group, 0 = imitated 194	  
out-group). No child changed their decision after initially engaging with the apparatuses. Children’s 195	  
in-group and out-group liking ratings were scored on a scale of 1-5 (1 = really don’t like - 5 = really 196	  
like), and their desire to change groups was coded dichotomously (1 = yes, 2 = no). All data were live 197	  
coded and recorded directly into the video display software. Reliability coding was also conducted 198	  
live for 20% of children tested. Reliability coding was conducted by a research assistant who was 199	  
blind to the study aims and hypotheses. Due to the dichotomous nature of the variable, Cohen’s K was 200	  
used to assess reliability. Perfect reliability was found for both the paper task, κ > .999, p < .001, and 201	  
the sticker task, κ > .999, p < .001.  202	  
Results 203	  
Preliminary Analyses 204	  
  Post-hoc power analyses revealed that with the sample size (N = 114) and standard alpha 205	  
(.05) we achieved power of  .88 - .99 for the main analyses. McNemar test revealed no significant 206	  
differences between imitation for the paper task or the sticker task, p > .999. As such, data was 207	  
collapsed across imitation scores with intention of conducting a multinomial logistic regression. 208	  
However, insufficient cell frequencies compromised the model validity for a multinomial analysis. 209	  
Therefore, two separate binomial logistic regressions were conducted (one per task). There was no 210	  
effect of sex or task presentation order on in-group liking ratings, ps > .170, or desire to change 211	  
groups, ps > .223. In addition, there was no effect of sex on imitation for either the paper task or 212	  
sticker task, ps > .167. However, there was an effect of task presentation order on imitation for the 213	  
sticker task, p = .021, but not the paper task, p = .985. As such, task presentation order was entered as 214	  
a control variable in the model examining imitation in the sticker task.  215	  
Imitation  216	  
  Paper Task. A binomial logistic regression was run to determine the effect of age (older vs. 217	  
younger) and condition (pro/antisocial vs. neutral) on children’s tendency to imitate the in-group in 218	  
the paper task. Overall, the model provided good fit for the data with the final model significantly 219	  
predicting the dependent variable over and above the intercept only model χ2 (3) = 16.02, p = .001. 220	  
Pseudo R2 values ranged from .083 (Cox & Snell) to .134 (Nagelkerke). Results revealed that an 221	  
interaction between age and condition accounted for children’s imitation choices χ2 (1) = 9.81, p = 222	  
.002. We further examined this interaction at the each level of age (Figure 2). For younger children, 223	  
condition did not significantly account for imitation choices χ2 (1) = 1.87, p = .172. For older children, 224	  
condition significantly accounted for imitation choices χ2 (1) = 12.15, p < .001. That is, older children 225	  
who were in the control condition were .107 times more likely to imitate the in-group than those in the 226	  
experimental condition (95% CI, .027 to .425) (See Appendix B for full results of each analysis).  227	  
* 
 228	  
Figure 2. Children’s tendency to imitate the in-group vs. the out-group on the paper task as a function 229	  
of condition and age.  230	  
  Sticker Task. A binomial logistic regression was run to determine the effect of age (older vs. 231	  
younger) and condition (pro/antisocial vs. neutral) on children’s tendency to imitate the in-group in 232	  
the sticker task. Task presentation order was included as a control variable. Overall, the model 233	  
provided good fit for the data with the final model significantly predicting the dependent variable over 234	  
and above the intercept only model χ2 (4) = 21.28, p < .001. Pseudo R2 values ranged from .170 (Cox 235	  
& Snell) to .251 (Nagelkerke). Results revealed that an interaction between age and condition 236	  
accounted for children’s imitation choices χ2 (1) = 6.60, p = .010. We further examined this 237	  
interaction at the each level of age (Figure 3). For younger children, condition did not significantly 238	  
account for imitation choices χ2 (1) = .020, p = .888. For older children, condition significantly 239	  
accounted for imitation choices χ2 (1) = 10.67, p = .001. That is, older children who were in the 240	  
control condition were .068 times more likely to imitate the in-group than those in the experimental 241	  
condition (95% CI, .014 to .342). (See Appendix B for full results of each analysis). 242	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Figure 3. Children’s tendency to imitate the in-group vs. the out-group on the sticker task as a 246	  
function of condition and age.  247	  
Reported Social Preferences  248	  
 In-group liking ratings. A paired samples t-test was conducted to determine if the in-group 249	  
preference manipulation had been successful. Results revealed that at pre-test, children liked their in-250	  
group (M = 4.44, SD = 1.01) significantly more than their out-group (M = 2.63, SD = 1.42), t (113) = 251	  
10.23, p < .001, d = 1.47. A three-way mixed design ANOVA including age (older vs. younger), 252	  
condition (pro/antisocial vs. neutral) and time (pre vs. post stimulus exposure) examined children’s in-253	  
group liking ratings. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed, but the full degrees of freedom 254	  
are reported. A time x condition x age interaction was found, F (1, 110) = 13.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. 255	  
Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant pre-post differences for younger children in either 256	  
condition. In contrast, older children showed significantly lower post-test in-group liking ratings when 257	  
the in-group had behaved antisocially compared to neutrally, F (1, 110) = 16.11, p < .001 (Table 3).  258	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 Control Experimental 
 Pre-Liking Post-Liking Pre-Liking Post-Liking 
Younger 4.36 (.19) 4.00 (.24)   4.52 (.21) 4.70 (.26) 
Older  4.42 (.18) 4.65 (.23) 4.47 (.18)a 3.37 (.22)b 
 Table 3. Mean and standard error of the pre and post in-group liking ratings as a function of condition 260	  
and age. Superscripts denote significant differences.  261	  
  Desire to change groups. A binomial logistic regression was performed determine the effect 262	  
of age (older vs. younger) and condition (pro/antisocial vs. neutral) on the likelihood that participants 263	  
would choose to change groups. Overall, the model provided good fit for the data with the final model 264	  
significantly predicting the dependent variable over and above the intercept only model χ2 (3) = 31.04, 265	  
p < .001. Pseudo R2 values ranged from .240 (Cox & Snell) to .324 (Nagelkerke). Results revealed 266	  
that an interaction between age and condition accounted for children’s desire to change groups χ2 (1) 267	  
= 22.81, p < .001. We further examined this interaction at each level of age (Table 4). For both 268	  
younger and older children, condition significantly accounted for children’s desire to change groups, 269	  
χ2 (1) = 9.19, p = .002 and χ2 (1) = 13.70, p < .001, respectively. That is, younger children who were 270	  
in the control condition were 2.67 times more likely to choose to change groups than children in the 271	  
experimental condition (95% CI, .039 to .498). In contrast, older children in the experimental 272	  
condition were .107 times more likely to choose to change groups than children in the control 273	  
condition (95% CI, 3.42 to 54.43). (See Appendix B for full results of each analysis). 274	  
 275	  
 276	  
 277	  
 278	  
 279	  
 B SE Wald df p Odds 
Ratio 
95% CI for Odds 
Ratio 
  Lower Upper 
Age -7.57 1.59 22.71 1 <.001 .001 .00 .01 
Condition -1.97 .650 9.19 1 .002 .14 .04 .50 
Age*Condition 4.58 .96 22.81 1 <.001 97.91 14.92 642.39 
Table 4. Children’s desire to change groups as predicted by age, condition and an age x condition 280	  
interaction. 281	  
Discussion  282	  
In this experiment, children aged 4-5 and 7-8 years were shown video demonstrations of an 283	  
antisocial in-group and a prosocial out-group completing a task, and were subsequently provided 284	  
opportunity to complete the same task. Children were also asked about their social preferences – how 285	  
much they liked the in-group and how much they wanted to change groups. Prior to the manipulation, 286	  
children showed a robust preference for the in-group as measured by liking ratings. As predicted, 287	  
older children showed a strong prosocial preference after being exposed to the manipulation. When 288	  
their in-group behaved antisocially and an out-group member behaved prosocially (compared to a 289	  
neutral control) they were less likely to imitate the in-group, reported lower liking of the in-group and 290	  
were more likely to choose to change groups, compared to when both groups performed neutral tasks. 291	  
In contrast, younger children opted to imitate the in-group and reported liking them equally, 292	  
regardless of their behavior. Surprisingly, young children were also less likely to want to change 293	  
groups when their in-group behaved antisocially and the out-group behaved prosocially, compared to 294	  
when both groups were neutral.    295	  
These findings speak to the importance of understanding intergroup bias in a range of social 296	  
affiliative measures. Notably, past research has shown children to be discerning in their imitation 297	  
preferences, choosing to imitate individuals over a majority consensus when the individual strategy is 298	  
optimal (Burdett et al., 2016; Wilks et al., 2015). However, we also see that imitating an in-group 299	  
elicits powerful social pull, even in very young children (e.g. Buttelmann et al., 2013; Howard et al., 300	  
2015). Here, we provide the first evidence of (older) children’s willingness to reject the in-group as an 301	  
imitation model in the context of the modelled actions causing harm. This speaks to the strong 302	  
prosocial motivations that emerge in middle childhood (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Smith et al., 2013) 303	  
and highlights children’s willingness to disengage with antisocial in-groups in a social learning 304	  
context.  305	  
This aligns with previously established age-related changes in socio-moral development: 306	  
throughout this time period children experience major developments in their adherence to prosocial 307	  
norms (Smith et al., 2013), their capacity to consider others when making socio-moral judgments 308	  
(Cooley & Killen, 2015; Elenbaas et al., 2016; Killen et al., 2011), and their own willingness to incur 309	  
personal cost to rectify prosocial violations (McAuliffe et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011). The 310	  
current findings demonstrate that, by 7 years of age, children are capable of eschewing the social 311	  
pressures associated with in-group preferences and allow prosociality to guide their social learning 312	  
decisions. This research thus provides the first behavioral evidence of what is now a growing body of 313	  
research demonstrating that, with age, we see increased social nuances in the interplay between 314	  
morality and social judgments (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Elenbaas et al., 2016; Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, 315	  
Abrams, & Killen, 2014; Killen, 2007; Killen et al., 2011). For example, Elenbaas et al. (2016) 316	  
identified that by 9-10 years children will allocate resources on need and relative advantage, rather 317	  
than group bias. Placing the current findings among these later developments alludes to a potential 318	  
new trajectory of judgement emerging from around 8 years and continuing into adolescence.  319	  
This also raises the question of younger children’s motivations. Children’s reported liking 320	  
preferences and imitation appeared unaffected by antisocial in-group behavior. Moreover, they 321	  
actually opted to change groups less when the in-group was antisocial. The desire to stay with an 322	  
antisocial group appears counterintuitive – why prefer the behavior of an antisocial group over a 323	  
neutral one, regardless of out-group behavior? Narrative comprehension checking ensured this was 324	  
not an issue with interpretation – children were able to identify that the in-group behavior was 325	  
antisocial. Instead, we argue that children’s desire to change groups may have been an attempt to 326	  
justify their actions. That is, once they had performed the antisocial behavior demonstrated by in-327	  
group, they may have felt compelled to commit to their decision, and thus their social group. This is 328	  
supported by research demonstrating children’s capacity to experience, and desire to avoid, cognitive 329	  
dissonance in decision making (Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007). The persisting high in-group 330	  
preferences in the antisocial in-group condition (comparable to control) provide further support for 331	  
this idea.  332	  
Alternatively, these attitudes could reflect a desire to preserve in-group reputation. That is, by 333	  
preferring to stay in an antisocial in-group children may have been attempting to justify that the 334	  
behaviors performed were not necessarily problematic. Past research shows that young children will 335	  
distort information to preserve a positive image of their in-group when reiterating stories in which the 336	  
in-group had performed antisocial actions (Dunham et al., 2011). Again, this is further supported by 337	  
the persisting in-group bias in the antisocial in-group condition. This argument is premised on the idea 338	  
of children feeling responsibility for in-group action. In support of this, young children have been 339	  
shown to feel responsibility for, and shared guilt from, damage of others property caused by in-group 340	  
transgressors (Over, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2016). Notably, this effect occurred for damage caused by 341	  
in-groups more than out-groups, thus indicating the feelings were not mere concern for the victim.  342	  
Otherwise, this finding could reflect that younger children simply believed that they were 343	  
adhering to a group norm which happened to be antisocial. If this is the case, it suggests that, at least 344	  
at this age, children’s prosocial concerns are not so apparent so as to encourage group norm violation. 345	  
Additionally, although manipulation checks confirmed that children perceived the antisocial behavior 346	  
as intended, it remains possible that younger children neither perceive a prosocial norm nor saw one 347	  
as having been violated. Again, this may be reflective of younger children’s different social 348	  
expectations around social interactions. Finally, it could be simply that younger children do not have 349	  
the capacity to grasp such complex social situations. Fully-fledged theory of mind only emerges 350	  
around 4 to 5 years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) – perhaps the younger children were 351	  
limited in their ability to comprehend all motivations in this scenario and thus focused on a salient 352	  
category, group preferences. Future research exploring the relationships between a priority for 353	  
prosocial concern over in-group biases and theory of mind development promise to yield important 354	  
insight into these key aspects of children’s socio-cognitive development.  355	  
Our primary focus in this research was to establish if, while engaged in social learning, 356	  
children prioritise favoring in-group decisions or prosocial concerns, and if so when such favoring 357	  
might emerge developmentally. We provide clear answers to these questions. Missing is detail on the 358	  
reasons why the children we tested made the decisions they did. Asking the children to explain their 359	  
choices may have yielded important insight into the motivations driving the behavior we document. 360	  
Replicating this research with the inclusion of reasoning data thus stands out as a future direction for 361	  
this line of work.  362	  
Notably, in the current study all group member models were portrayed by adult Western 363	  
females. Past studies have successfully employed adult females as in-group demonstrators (Watson-364	  
Jones, Whitehouse, & Legare, 2015; Wilks & Nielsen, 2017). Additionally, no gender effects were 365	  
identified in the current study and in-group liking ratings indicated that the group bias manipulations 366	  
were successful. The model characteristics of age and sex are thus unlikely to have impacted our 367	  
findings in any tangible way. However, some of the non-Western children may have not felt the same 368	  
strength of affiliation with the models as the Western children. In this context, though, that the 369	  
younger children were willing to perform antisocial actions to affiliate with an arbitrary group 370	  
(colour) may be telling of the potential capacity for a more meaningful group (such as age, sex or 371	  
race) to influence their behavior. This warrants further investigation. A meaningful extension would 372	  
be to evaluate children’s responses when the in/out-group distinction is made deliberately salient, for 373	  
example by studying an ethnically diverse sample, having the in-group/out-group target reflect the 374	  
population of the sample. It should also be acknowledged that children in the current study may have 375	  
perceived the adult demonstrators as teachers, and thus imitated them because of this, rather than 376	  
because of their group status. While it is beyond the scope of this study to rule out this explanation, 377	  
research has found that children are equally likely to imitate older and same age peers relative to 378	  
younger peers (Brody & Stoneman, 1981). As such, age may not be a determining factor in whether 379	  
children’s social learning motivation stems from affiliative or pedagogical drivers.  380	  
It is also important to consider the context of the modelled actions. Research is beginning to 381	  
differentiate imitation of causally transparent vs. causally opaque actions; such that children appear to 382	  
consider opaque actions as normative, and thus show higher fidelity imitation for such actions relative 383	  
to instrumental actions (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013; Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015; 384	  
Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Nielsen, Tomaselli, & Kapitány, 2018). Here, the actions employed 385	  
were functional and causally transparent. As such, children may show a stronger pull to imitate in-386	  
groups if demonstrated actions are opaque, and hence interpreted as being normative. In this context, 387	  
older children may have been more inclined to imitate their in-group even when they behaved 388	  
antisocially if the actions presented were causally opaque. Future research should explore if this 389	  
developmental pattern varies as a function of the characteristics of the actions demonstrated.  390	  
Finally, calls are intensifying for developmental psychology to be more culturally inclusive 391	  
(Causadias, Vitriol, & Atkin, 2018; Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017). 392	  
The paradigm developed here should now be implemented in a less homogenous sample to establish 393	  
the cultural specificity of our findings as well as provide a more balanced design. Moreover, this 394	  
would address the aforementioned concerns about the impact of the cultural background of the 395	  
demonstrators potentially influencing the group manipulation.  396	  
Here we identified that older (7-8 years), but not younger (4-5 years) children were less likely 397	  
to imitate an in-group when members of this group acted in antisocial ways, and concomitantly 398	  
reported both reduced liking and increased desire to change groups in this context. In contrast, 399	  
younger children showed a strong in-group preference, regardless of behavior, such that they both 400	  
imitated and liked the in-group members irrespective of their antisocial behavior. Moreover, they 401	  
actually opted to change groups less when the in-group was antisocial, compared to neutral. This 402	  
study was the first of its kind to explore the role of antisocial behavior on direct imitation in an 403	  
intergroup context, shedding light on both imitation behavior and group biases. The findings speak to 404	  
the trajectory of socio-moral development, demonstrating the increasing capacity with age for 405	  
children to weigh up multiple pieces of information. Moreover, it informs our understanding of when 406	  
and why children might preference different social learning models. Imitation, as an inherently social 407	  
action, is a hugely powerful tool in the human social learning repertoire. The capacity for 408	  
discrimination in who one elects as a social learning model is pivotal for young children’s integration 409	  
into a cooperative society. This study shows a clear distinction between 5 and 7 years in children’s 410	  
capacity to make informed judgments using prosociality as a social guide. 411	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Appendix A – Video Demonstration Descriptions 562	  
 563	  
Sticker Task – Experimental Condition  564	  
Prosocial Script. Agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus with two boxes adjacent 565	  
to each other, approximately 30cms apart. One box is transparent (Perspex) and one is opaque (wood). 566	  
There are 5 stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the boxes.  Agent taps hand onto the 567	  
transparent box and says “Oh look, its Sam’s stickers, they need to be put away. I care about Sam so I 568	  
am going to put them in this container so Sam can find them later. Everyone in X group puts them in 569	  
here”. Agent then places the stickers in the transparent box.  570	  
Antisocial Script. Agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus with two boxes adjacent 571	  
to each other, approximately 30cms apart. One box is transparent (Perspex) and one is opaque (wood). 572	  
There are 5 stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the boxes.  Agent taps hand onto the 573	  
opaque box and says “Oh look, its Sam’s stickers, they need to be put away. I don’t care about Sam so 574	  
I am going to put them in this container so Sam can’t find them later. Everyone in X group puts them 575	  
in here”. Agent then places the stickers in the opaque box.  576	  
Sticker Task – Control Condition  577	  
Neutral Script (Prosocial Equivalent). Agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus 578	  
with two boxes adjacent to each other, approximately 30cms apart. One box is transparent (Perspex) 579	  
and one is opaque (wood). There are 5 stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the 580	  
boxes.  Agent taps hand onto the transparent box and says “Oh look, here are some stickers, they need 581	  
to be put away. I am going to put them in this container. Everyone in X group puts them in here”. 582	  
Agent then places the stickers in the transparent box.  583	  
Neutral Script (Antisocial Equivalent). Agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus 584	  
with two boxes adjacent to each other, approximately 30cms apart. One box is transparent (Perspex) 585	  
and one is opaque (wood) There are 5 stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the boxes.  586	  
Agent taps hand onto the opaque box and says “Oh look, here are some stickers, they need to be put 587	  
away. I’m going to put them in this container. Everyone in X group puts them in here”. Agent then 588	  
places the stickers in the opaque box.  589	  
Paper Task – Experimental Condition  590	  
Prosocial Script. Agent stands behind a table with a jar and two pieces of paper, one 591	  
patterned and one plain. Agent says “See this jar (taps jar) – I have to fill it up with paper. That means 592	  
I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up plain paper) or this piece of paper (holds up 593	  
patterned paper). The plain paper doesn’t belong to anyone. The patterned paper belongs to Alex. 594	  
That means this paper isn’t anyones (holds up plain paper), but this paper is Alex’s (holds up 595	  
patterned paper). I care that the patterned paper belongs to Alex so I’m going to tear up the plain 596	  
paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the plain paper.” Agent then tears plain paper into four pieces 597	  
and places it in jar.  598	  
Antisocial Script. Agent stands behind a table with a jar and two pieces of paper, one 599	  
patterned and one plain. Agent says “See this jar (taps jar) – I have to fill it up with paper. That means 600	  
I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up plain paper) or this piece of paper (holds up 601	  
patterned paper). The plain paper doesn’t belong to anyone. The patterned paper belongs to Alex. 602	  
That means this paper isn’t anyone’s (holds up plain paper), but this paper is Alex’s (holds up 603	  
patterned paper). I don’t care that the patterned paper belongs to Alex so I’m going to tear up the 604	  
patterned paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the patterned paper.” Agent then tears patterned 605	  
paper into four pieces and places it in jar.  606	  
Paper Task – Control Condition  607	  
Neutral Script (Prosocial Equivalent). Agent stands behind a table with a jar and two pieces 608	  
of paper, one patterned and one plain. See this jar (taps jar) – I have to fill it up with paper. That 609	  
means I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up plain paper) or this piece of paper 610	  
(holds up patterned paper). The plain paper doesn’t belong to anyone. The patterned paper doesn’t 611	  
belong to anyone. That means this paper isn’t anyone’s (holds up plain paper). And this paper isn’t 612	  
anyone’s (holds up patterned paper). I’m glad the plain paper isn't anyone’s. I’m going to tear up the 613	  
plain paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the plain paper. Agent then tears plain paper into four 614	  
pieces and places it in jar. 615	  
Neutral Script (Antisocial Equivalent). Agent stands behind a table with a jar and two 616	  
pieces of paper, one patterned and one plain. See this jar (taps jar) – I have to fill it up with paper. 617	  
That means I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up plain paper) or this piece of paper 618	  
(holds up patterned paper). The plain paper doesn’t belong to anyone. The patterned paper doesn’t 619	  
belong to anyone. That means this paper isn’t anyone’s (holds up plain paper). And this paper isn’t 620	  
anyone’s (holds up patterned paper). I’m glad the patterned paper isn't anyone’s. I’m going to tear up 621	  
the patterned paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the patterned paper. Agent then tears patterned 622	  
paper into four pieces and places it in jar. 623	  
 624	  
 625	  
 626	  
 627	  
 628	  
 629	  
 630	  
 631	  
 632	  
 633	  
 634	  
 635	  
Appendix B – Full Regression Tables 636	  
 637	  
Part A: Paper Task 638	  
 639	  
 640	  
Main analysis 641	  
 642	  
Table 1. 643	  
 644	  
Variables in the equation for full regression model. 645	  
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Age_Group 4.532 1.638 7.650 1 .006 92.919 3.745 2305.445 
Condition_Simple .981 .747 1.723 1 .189 2.667 .617 11.535 
Age_Group by 
Condition_Simple 
-3.214 1.026 9.818 1 .002 .040 .005 .300 
Constant -.065 1.041 .004 1 .951 .938   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Age_Group, Condition_Simple, Age_Group * Condition_Simple . 
 
 646	  
 647	  
 648	  
 649	  
 650	  
 651	  
 652	  
 653	  
 654	  
 655	  
 656	  
 657	  
 658	  
 659	  
 660	  
 661	  
 662	  
Follow up interaction at each level of age 663	  
Younger children (4-5 years) 664	  
 665	  
Table 2. 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 1.867 1 .172 
Block 1.867 1 .172 
Model 1.867 1 .172 
Age Group = Younger. 
 666	  
Table 3.  
 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 51.315b .036 .056 
Age Group = Younger. 
 667	  
Table 4. 668	  
 669	  
Variables in the equation for younger children. 670	  
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Condition_Simple .981 .747 1.723 1 .189 2.667 .617 11.535 
Constant -.065 1.041 .004 1 .951 .938   
Age Group = Younger.  
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Condition_Simple. 
 
 671	  
 672	  
 673	  
 674	  
 675	  
 676	  
 677	  
 678	  
Older children (7-8 years) 679	  
 680	  
Table 5.  
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 13.064 1 .000 
Block 13.064 1 .000 
Model 13.064 1 .000 
Age Group = Older. 
 681	  
Table 6.  
 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 64.073b .187 .256 
Age Group = Older 
 682	  
 683	  
Table 7. 684	  
 685	  
Variables in the equation for older children. 686	  
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Condition_Simple -2.234 .703 10.098 1 .001 .107 .027 .425 
Constant 4.467 1.265 12.463 1 .000 87.111   
Age Group = Older.  
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Condition_Simple. 
 
 687	  
 688	  
 689	  
 690	  
 691	  
 692	  
 693	  
 694	  
 695	  
Part B: Sticker Task 696	  
 697	  
Main analysis 698	  
 699	  
 700	  
Table 8. 
 
Variables in the equation for full regression model. 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Condition_Simple .081 .699 .013 1 .908 1.085 .276 4.267 
Age_Group 4.212 1.863 5.108 1 .024 67.462 1.749 2601.689 
Age_Group by 
Condition_Simple 
-2.781 1.083 6.596 1 .010 .062 .007 .518 
Which_Task_First 1.003 .494 4.124 1 .042 2.726 1.036 7.173 
Constant -.250 1.300 .037 1 .847 .779   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Age_Group, Condition_Simple, Age_Group * Condition_Simple ,Which_Task_First.  
 
 701	  
 702	  
 703	  
 704	  
 705	  
 706	  
 707	  
 708	  
 709	  
 710	  
 711	  
 712	  
 713	  
 714	  
 715	  
 716	  
 717	  
 718	  
Follow up interaction at each level of age 719	  
Younger Children (4-5 years) 720	  
 721	  
Table 9.  722	  
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 2.759 2 .252 
Block 2.759 2 .252 
Model 2.759 2 .252 
Age Group = Younger 
 723	  
 724	  
Table 10.  
 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 50.423b .053 .081 
Age Group = Younger 
 725	  
 726	  
 727	  
 728	  
Table 11.  
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1b Condition_Simple .099 .706 .020 1 .888 1.104 .277 4.406 
Which_Task_First 1.192 .752 2.512 1 .113 3.293 .754 14.377 
Constant -.530 1.541 .118 1 .731 .589   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Condition_Simple, Which_Task_First. 
Age Group = Younger 
 
 729	  
 730	  
 731	  
Older Children (7-8 years) 732	  
 733	  
Table 12.  
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 17.900 2 .000 
Block 17.900 2 .000 
Model 17.900 2 .000 
Age Group = Older 
 734	  
 735	  
Table 13.  
 
Model Summary  
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 57.482b .247 .354 
a. Age Group = Older 
 
 736	  
 737	  
Table 14.  
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1b Condition_Simple -2.683 .821 10.674 1 .001 .068 .014 .342 
Which_Task_First .851 .661 1.659 1 .198 2.341 .641 8.547 
Constant 4.145 1.721 5.802 1 .016 63.145   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Condition_Simple, Which_Task_First. 
Age_Group = Older 
 
 738	  
 739	  
 740	  
 741	  
 742	  
Part C: Desire to change groups 743	  
Main Analysis  744	  
 745	  
Table 15.  746	  
Variables in the equation 747	  
 748	  
       95% C.I. for EXP(B) 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Age -7.57 1.59 22.71 1 <.001 .001 .00 .01 
Condition -1.97 .650 9.19 1 .002 .14 .04 .50 
Age*Condition 4.58 .96 22.81 1 <.001 97.91 14.92 642.39 
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Age, Condition, Age*Condition. 749	  
 750	  
 751	  
 752	  
 753	  
 754	  
 755	  
 756	  
 757	  
 758	  
 759	  
 760	  
 761	  
 762	  
 763	  
 764	  
 765	  
 766	  
Follow up interaction at each level of age 767	  
Younger children (4-5 years) 768	  
 769	  
Table 16.  
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 10.488 1 .001 
Block 10.488 1 .001 
Model 10.488 1 .001 
Age Group = Younger 
 770	  
 771	  
Table 17.  
 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 58.747b .189 .252 
Age Group = Younger 
 
 772	  
 773	  
Table 18.  
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1b Condition_Simple -1.971 .650 9.193 1 .002 .139 .039 .498 
Constant 2.718 .956 8.086 1 .004 15.153   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Condition_Simple. 
Age Group = Younger 
 774	  
 775	  
 776	  
 777	  
 778	  
 779	  
Older children (7-8 years) 780	  
 781	  
Table 19.  
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 18.574 1 .000 
Block 18.574 1 .000 
Model 18.574 1 .000 
Age Group = Older 
 782	  
 783	  
Table 20.  
 
Model Summary 
 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 62.942b .255 .352 
Age Group = Older 
 
 784	  
 785	  
Table 21.  
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1b Condition_Simple 2.613 .706 13.695 1 .000 13.641 3.418 54.437 
Constant -4.847 1.267 14.629 1 .000 .008   
Variable(s) entered on step 1: Condition_Simple. 
Age Group = Older 
 786	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